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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI 
IN THE WAKE OF ALEXANDER v. SANDOVAL: 
DISPARATE-IMPACT REGULATIONS STILL 
VALID UNDER CHEVRON 
DAVID J. GALALIS* 
Abstract: Disparate-impact regulations promulgated by EPA pursuant to 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, until recently, had shown promise 
as a private legal tool to obtain redress from the disparate siting of envi-
ronmental harms in minority communities. Alexander v. Sandoval, how-
ever, has held that there exists no private implied cause of action to en-
force disparate-impact regulations. In so doing, the Court also strongly 
suggested that disparate-impact regulations, standing alone within EPA's 
own administrative enforcement process, were invalid exercises of admin-
istrative discretion under Title VI. The Court's implicit reasoning, based 
upon Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, is un persuasive because, 
contrary to Sandoval's assertion, Bakke never held that there existed clear 
congressional intent to limit the scope of Title VI to intentional discrim-
ination. Conversely, prior Supreme Court caselaw has never held that dis-
parate-impact regulations are valid. Rather, an analysis under the holding 
of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council is the only appropriate 
tool with which to prove the validity of disparate-impact regulations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Environmental justice is a movement that attempts to forge con-
ceptual and legal connections between the fundamentally intertwined 
social problems of race/class discrimination and environmental protec-
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. I 
would like to thank the tireless efforts of the past and present editorial staffs, and the en-
couragement of Prof. Zygmunt Plater, who showed me the rewards of untangling the law's 
toughest questions. Many thanks also to Nicholas Targ of the EPA Office of Environmental 
Justice, acting in his personal capacity, without whom I would not have known that this 
tough question was in need of untangling. 
I would also like to acknowledge the formative influence of my family, along with my 
past professors and current colleagues at the College of the Holy Cross. This Note would 
not have been possible without the critical skills and motivating passion they continue to 
impart. 
Ad M~orem Dei Gloriam. 
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tion.1 Although civil rights and environmentalism are both viewed as 
progressive movements, many argue that their work has traditionally 
conflicted with one another.2 In recent decades, however, these ideo-
logical camps have recognized their common goals and approaches,3 
giving rise to a hybrid, yet independent, environmental justice move-
ment.4 
Civil rights advocates, and the more recently galvanized environ-
mental justice movement, recognize that poor, minority communities 
are exposed to a disproportionately greater share of environmental 
hazards than affiuent, Caucasian neighborhoods-not because of in-
I See, e.g., Eileen Guana, Federal Environmental Citizen Pmvisions: Obstacles and Incentives 
on the Road to Environmentaljustice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 2-4 (1995) ("[T]he phrase ['envi-
ronmental racism'] connected two complicated social problems previously unconnected in 
the minds of many: environmental hazards and racial injustice."); Alice Kaswan, Environ-
mental Laws: Gristfor the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 389 n.1 (1999) ("The 
environmental justice movement has also encompassed the question of whether low-
income communities receive a fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens."); 
Richard J. Lazarus, Symposium, Innovations in Environmental Policy: "Envimnmental Racism! 
That's What It Is, "2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 259-61 (2000) [hereinafter Lazarus, Environ-
mental Racism] (suggesting that long time civil rights activist and former NAACP executive 
director Benjamin Chavis's coinage of the phrase "environmental racism" more adequately 
embodied what "environmental justice" had only hinted at-that the nation's environ-
mental laws were inherently racist in both implementation and application). 
2 See, e.g., Guana supra note 1, at 3 n.5; Kaswan, supra note 1, at 389 & n.2. "The his-
torical tension between the civil rights and environmental movements has left the civil-
rights-based environmental justice movement with an unsurpassing skepticism of environ-
mental laws." Id. at 389; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental justice": The 
DistrilnttionalEffects ofEllvironmentalPmtection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 788-89 (1993) [here-
inafter Lazarus, Pursuing Envitvn1Tlclltai justice]. Lazarus writes that during the emergence 
of environmentalism as a legally and politically potent force in the 1970s, "environmental-
ists were seen as ignoring both the 'urban environment' and the needs of the poor in favor 
of seeking 'govern men tal assistance to avoid the un pleasan t externalities of the very system 
from which they themselves [had] already benefited so extensively.'" Id. at 788 (quoting 
Peter Marcuse, Conservation for Whom?, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IN URBAN AMERICA 73, 75 (james N. Smith ed., 1974». It has been argued that this dis-
turbing reality went unnoticed because 1970s environmentalism found its structural and 
moral grounding in the civil rights movement of previous decades. See id. at 789 & n.lO. 
Accordingly, the cognitive dissonance aroused by the charge that the two progressive 
movements were at odds was possibly too great to allow recognition of this reality in the 
minds of many 1970s environmentalists. See id. at 789 & n.ll. 
3 Kaswan, supra note 1, at 389 ("The emergence of the environmental justice move-
ment has prompted the traditional civil rights and environmental movements to confront 
each other's traditions, expectations, aspirations, and modes of action."). 
4 See generally Guana, supra note I, at 7-22 (detailing the rise of environmental justice 
into the national consciousness, as catalyzed by the Warren County, North CaI'Olina poly-
chlorinated biphenyl landfill protests of 1982); Julia B. Latham Worsham, Dispamte IlIIpact 
Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Call a Legal Tool Build Environmental justice?, 27 B.C. 
ENVTL. Au. L. REV. 631, 631-37 (2000) (presenting a concise history of the origins of the 
modern environmental justice movement). 
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vidious racism, but as a result of neutral decisions made within intrinsi-
cally biased decision-making structures.5 These "disparate impacts" can 
be observed in three contexts: (1) disparate siting and permitting of 
hazardous facilities;6 (2) disparate enforcement of environmentallaws;7 
and (3) disparate clean-up of contaminated sites.s In seeking to allevi-
ate and prevent environmental harm from accruing to poor, minority 
communities, environmental justice practitioners rely heavily upon pri-
vate litigation,9 but also attempt to influence the way policymakers 
conduct their administrative decision-making. Io Additionally, negotia-
tion has begun to emerge as a viable alternative for citizen groups seek-
ing to prevent or minimize the environmental harm suffered by their 
communities. I I 
Some recent litigation has focused on employing Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) 12 and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) regulations enacted in accordance therewith.l3 Title VI is 
divided into two operative parts: (1) section 601 creates a general pro-
hibition against discrimination by barring recipients of federal money 
from subjecting beneficiaries to discrimination on the basis of race;I4 
and (2) section 602 directs that all federal agencies responsible for ad-
ministering federal funds shall implement regulations that "effectuate 
the provisions of section 601. "15 In 1973, pursuant to the congressional 
mandate of section 602, EPA promulgated regulations that both pro-
hibited intentional racial discrimination by recipients of EPA funding,I6 
5 See Guana, supra note 1, at 29-32. 
6 See id. at 31-34. 
7 See id. at 34-36. 
8 See id. at 36-38. 
9 See generally Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Millen. City 
of Dallas, 2002 WL 230834 (N.D. Tex. Feb 14, 2002). Both cases provide a general intro-
duction to the breadth of issues involved in environmental justice litigation, and illustrate 
the variety of claims that can be raised. For cases built specifically around Title VI causes of 
action, see infra Part I.B.2. 
10 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10-.115 (2002) (imposing Title VI requirements upon recipients 
of EPA funding, and outlining administrative procedures for determining compliance); 
Lazarus, Envi1Vnmelltal Racism, supra note 1, at 265-67; see also infra Parts I.A, I.B.l. 
11 See Lazarus, Environme11tal Racism, supra note 1, at 271-73. See generally Janet V. Sie-
gel, Note, Negotiatingfor Envi1VnmentaIJustice: Turning Polluters into "Good Neighbors" Through 
Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.V. ENVTL. LJ. 147, 171-95 (2002) (explaining the emerg-
ing concept of "collaborative bargaining"). 
12 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 §§ 601--602 (codified as 
amended at 42 V.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-l (2000». 
13 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10-.120. 
14 42 V.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
15 42 V.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
16 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.30, 7.35(a). 
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as well as the use of "criteria or methods" having the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination because oftheir raceP 
The Title VI means toward achieving environmental justice, how-
ever, has been short lived.18 Initially, litigants attempted to directly en-
force EPA's so-called "disparate-impact regulations" by claiming the 
existence of an implied private right of action.l9 When the Supreme 
Court in Alexander v. Sandoval 20 held that no implied private right of 
action existed to enforce these regulations, litigants turned to § 198321 
to allege that siting decisions having a disparate impact deprived 
plaintiffs of federal rights secured under EPA disparate-impact regula-
tions.22 This approach too has been severely curtailed, most recently 
by the Third Circuit,23 which held that EPA disparate-impact regula-
tions create no right enforceable under § 1983.24 Although the Su-
preme Court has yet to decide whether disparate-impact regulations 
can create rights enforceable under § 1983,25 many commentators 
have signaled that Title VI has now been effectively foreclosed as a 
private avenue of attack in the litigious crusade toward environmental 
justice.26 Furthermore, Sandoval has been read to cast severe doubt 
upon the validity of Title VI disparate-impact regulations in and of 
themselves,27 which would eradicate any efforts to administratively 
enforce these regulations through agency processes.28 
17 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). Throughout this Note, these, and similarly constructed regula-
tions, are referred to as "disparate-impact regulations." 
18 See generally Lisa S. Core, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval: Why a Supreme Court Case About 
Driver's Licenses Matters to Environmental justice Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 191, 
199-242 (2002) (chronicling the history of private disparate-impact Tide VI environ-
mental justice litigation, and concluding that private disparate-impact claims are no longer 
legally cognizable). 
19 See infra Part I.B.2. 
20 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
2142 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
22 See infra Part I.B.2.d. 
23 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 
2001) [SOlttll Camden III]. 
24 See inji'a Part I.B.2.d. 
25 They have, however, come extremely close. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 
283 (2002) (holding that in order for spending legislation to create enforceable rights 
under § 1983, Congress must provide clear and unambiguous language indicating their 
intent to create individual rights against any state actor that accepts federal funds). 
26 See Core, supra note 18, at 239-42. 
27 See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
28 Over forty administrative agencies aside from EPA have promulgated disparate-
impact regulations pursuant to their asserted authority under Title VI. Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 619 (1983) (Marshall,]., dissenting). As such, the long-
2004] EllvirollmentalJustice & Title VI 65 
This Note will argue, however, that while Sandoval 29 and South 
Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (South Camden //1)30 have stripped Title VI regulations of both an 
implied right of action and § 1983 enforceable rights, EPA's Title VI 
regulations still remain valid federal law under well established prin-
ciples of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of am-
biguous statutes.31 Part I of this Note examines a brief history of dis-
parate-impact environmental justice litigation. Part II next explores 
case law bearing upon the validity of disparate-impact regulations 
promulgated pursuant to Title VI. Part lILA then rejects the assump-
tion that the validity of these regulations is already a settled issue, and 
Part III.B refutes the counter-assumption-implicitly sanctioned by 
Sandoval-that under prior case law such regulations are invalid. Mter 
having dismissed both these assumptions, Part III.C outlines a basic 
Chevron32 analysis of Title VI disparate impact regulations. Having 
done so, this Note ultimately concludes that Congress has not ex-
pressed a clear and unambiguous intent to limit the scope of Title VI 
to purposeful discrimination. Therefore, under the holding of Chev-
ron U.S.A., a court is constrained to defer to permissible agency con-
structions of the statute.33 Assuming then that EPA's disparate-impact 
regulations are permissible constructions of Title VI, they are valid 
federal law, despite SandovaCs implied assertions to the contrary. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTALjVSTICE UNDER TITLE VI 
A. The Structure of Title VI and EPA's Disparate-Impact Regulations 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to prohibit 
racial discrimination by entities receiving federal financial assis-
tance.34 Title VI is divided into two operative components: section 601 
and section 602.35 Section 601 prohibits racial discrimination by re-
cipients of federal funds. 36 Section 602 gives this proscription effect by 
term consequences of Sandovafs holding will extend well beyond the immediate realm of 
environmental justice. 
29 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 V.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
30 South Camden III, 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001). 
31 Chevron, V.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI §§ 601-602, 42 V.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-1 (2000). 
351d. 
36 42 V.S.C. § 2000d (2000) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
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requiring that all agencies empowered to distribute federal funding 
issue regulations designed to "effectuate the provisions" of section 
601.37 These regulations must also be "consistent with achievement of 
the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance. "38 
Pursuant to the congressional command of section 602, in 1973 
EPA promulgated a regulation39 that prohibits recipients of EPA funds 
-state environmental protection agencies, for example-from using 
"criteria or methods of administering its program which have the effect 
of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, 
national origin, or sex .... "40 The regulation thereby alleviates the 
traditional plaintiffs burden of proving intent, which exists when 
bringing actions under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause.41 Under EPA's so-called "disparate-impact regulations," 
proof of a disparate impact is alone sufficient to meet the plaintiffs 
burden.42 Given the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, espe-
cially in the context of industrial permitting decisions,43 environ-
mental justice practitioners have viewed EPA's disparate-impact regu-
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance."). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Section 602 reads in pertinent part: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal 
financial assistance to any program or activity ... is authorized and directed 
to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such 
program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applica-
bility which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the stat-
ute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is 
taken. 
Id. Section 602 then goes on to set out the method for approval and enforcement of Title 
VI regulations. Id. 
38Id. 
39 38 Fed. Reg. 17,968 (1973), amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 2,306 (1981), amended by 49 Fed. 
Reg. 1,661 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2002». 
4°Id. (emphasis added). 
41 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1976). 
42 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). 
43 Lazarus, Pursuing Environmtmtal Justice, supra note § 2, at 830 (1993) ("Commen ta-
tors have long contended [thatl the practical effect of the required 'discriminatory intent' 
element is devastating to most civil rights claims because of the inordinate difficulty of 
proving the subjective, motivating intent of a decision maker."). For a particularly weighty 
example, in terms of human impact, of a case lost on equal protection grounds, see Bean 
v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp.673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), afj'd witholtt opin-
ion, 780 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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lations as a new weapon against the effects of systemic environmental 
discrimination.44 
B. Enforcement of EPA's Disparate-Impact Regulations 
1. Administrative Enforcement 
If a private individual believes he or she has suffered a discrimina-
tory effect as a result of action taken by a recipient of EPA financial as-
sistance, EPA's regulations allow that person to file a complaint with the 
EPA Office of Civil Rights (OCR).45 Upon filing, the complaint will be 
investigated for acceptance.46 If accepted, OCR will notifY the alleged 
recipient violator and complainant and give the recipient a chance to 
respond to the complaint in writing, after which time informal resolu-
tion will be attempted.47 If a complaint cannot be resolved informally, 
OCR will then serve the recipient with "notice of preliminary finding of 
noncompliance," which will contain recommendations for achieving 
voluntary compliance.48 The recipient may then either agree to these 
recommendations, send a written rebuttal of the preliminary findings, 
or respond with an explanation stating that compliance can be 
achieved in a way other than that recommended by OCR.49 If the re-
cipient does not take one of these actions, OCR will then send a formal 
written determination of noncompliance to the recipient. 50 Mter this 
time, the recipient has ten days from receipt of the formal determina-
tion of noncompliance to attain compliance.51 Mter ten days, OCR may 
begin funding-termination procedures. 52 
OCR was created in 1993 in response to President William J. 
Clinton's Executive Order 12,898,53 which was designed to prod fed-
44 See, e.g., Latham Worsham, supra note 4, at 644-46 (2000); Bradford C. Mank, Is There 
a Plivate Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental 
Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM.j. ENVTL. L. I, 12 (1999) ("Because plaintiffs have been unsuc-
cessful thus far in winning envil'Onmental discrimination claims under the Equal Pl'Otec-
tion Clause, advocates have tumed the focus to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act because it 
allows claims based on pl'Oof of unjustified disparate impacts."). 
45 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (2002). 
46 Id. § 7.I20(d) (1) (i). 
47Id. § 7.I20(d)(I)(ii)-(d)(2)(i). 
48Id. § 7.115(c)(I) (i)-(ii). 
49Id. § 7.115(d)(1)-(2). 
50Id. § 7.115(d) (2). 
51 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(e) (2002). 
52 Id.; id. § 7.130 (outlining pl'Ocedures for funding termination). 
53 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321 (2000). 
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eral agencies into taking affirmative steps toward meeting their Title 
VI obligations.54 Nevertheless, the OCR complaint process has been 
criticized as extremely inefficient.55 Between September, 1993 and 
August, 1998, OCR received fifty-eight complaints and responded to 
only four. 56 Of these four, only one was decided on the merits.57 Envi-
ronmental justice litigators have accordingly learned to look else-
where for satisfaction of their clients' grievances by following two tra-
ditional paths to federal court: one path contemplates a suit based on 
an implied private right of action under EPA's disparate-impact regu-
lations, and the other contemplates reliance upon § 1983.58 Both 
these paths, however, have been closed through a series of unfavor-
able federal court decisions.59 
2. Court Enforcement 
There are two central questions that any private litigant needs to 
ask before asserting a cause of action under any statute: what behavior 
does the statute proscribe, and is the statute privately enforceable? 
With respect to Title VI, the Supreme Court first began to wrestle with 
these questions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakk!'o and 
Cannon v. University of Chicago.61 Stating that "Title VI must be held to 
proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment," the Bakke Court ap-
peared to declare that Title VI prohibited only intentional acts of dis-
crimination.62 Later, in Cannon, the Court answered the second ques-
tion and ruled that Title VI created a private right of action.63 In 1983, 
however, Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission64 seemed to 
reopen the Bakke debate over whether intent was a necessary element 
of an implied Title VI right of action.65 Two years later in Alexander v. 
54 Latham Worsham, supra note 4, at 647-48. 
55 [d. 
56 [d. 
57 St. Francis Prayer Ctr. v. Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, EPA File No. 5R-98-R5, 
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/ssdec_ir.pdf(lastvisitedOct.26.2003).This case, 
also known as Select Steel, was decided adversely to the plaintiffs. [d. 
58 See infra Part I.B.2.a-b, d. 
59 See infra Part I.B.2.c-d. 
60 Regents of the Vniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 V.S. 265, 281-87 (1978). 
61 Cannon v. Vniv. of Chi., 441 V.S. 677, 694-703 (1979). 
62 See Bakke, 438 V.S. at 287. But see discussion infra Part III.B. 
63 Cannon, 441 V.S. at 694-703. 
64 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 V.S. 582 (1983). 
65 [d. at 583-607. In Guardians Association, a deeply divided Supreme Court handed 
down five conflicting and overlapping opinions on the scope of Title VI, rather than 
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Choate, the Court mercifully clarified the Guardians Association deci-
sion by identifying a "two pronged holding on the nature of the dis-
crimination proscribed by Title VI [that had] emerged in [Guardians 
Association] . "66 The Choate Court in terpreted Guardians Association as 
having declared that "Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances 
of intentional discrimination,"-and could be enforced privately ac-
cording to the holding in Cannon-but that "actions having an un-
justifiable disparate impact on minorities [could] be redressed 
through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of 
Title VI. "67 The question still remained, however, as to whether these 
disparate-impact regulations could be enforced in court by private 
parties.68 The first case to take up that question in the arena of envi-
ronmental justice was Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. 
Self (Chester Residents}.69 
a. Chester Residen ts: The First Court Vict01Y for EPA's Disparate-Impact 
Regulations 
Chester Residents involved a claim of disparate-impact discrimina-
tion against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protec-
tion for issuing a permit to a waste processing facility in a predomi-
nantly black community.70 Plaintiffs alleged that the issuance of the 
permit violated EPA's disparate-impact regulations.71 In ruling for the 
unanimously accepting Bakke's declaration of Title VI's coextensiveness with the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. (White, j.); id. at 607-12 (Powell, j., concurring); id. at 612-15 
(O'Connor,j., concurring); id. at 615-35 (Marshall,j., dissenting); id. at 635-45 (Stevens, 
j., dissenting). Commenting upon the five opinions handed down, Justice Powell re-
marked, "[o]ur opinions today will further confuse rather than guide." Id. at 608 (Powell, 
j., concurring). 
66 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985). 
67 Id. While an apparently simple opinion, Choate, in conjunction with Bakke and 
Guardians Association, has created immense confusion and debate regarding the scope and 
enforceability of Title VI. See discussion infra Part UI.A-B. 
68 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 929-31 (3d 
Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998) (declining to hold that Guardians Associa-
tion and Choate had already created a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations). The court wrote: "Guardians did not explicitly address whether a private right 
of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated under section 602." 
Id. at 929. The court also later writes, "we find no direct authority in Alexander [v. Choate] 
that either confirms or denies the existence of a private right of action." Id. at 931; see also 
Choate, 469 U.S. at 289-309 (declining to explicitly address the issue of whether an implied 
right of action exists to enforce disparate-impact regulations). 
69 132 F.3d at 932. 
70Id. at 927. 
71 Id. 
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residents, the court first found that there was no Supreme Court 
precedent as to whether an implied right of action existed under 
EPA's disparate-impact regulations, nor any precedent within the 
Third Circuit.72 Instead, to determine whether such an implied right 
existed in the present case, the court relied on its own three-prong 
test for locating implied rights of action within regulations.73 Applying 
its test, the court held that private plaintiffs could maintain an action 
under disparate-impact regulations promulgated pursuant to Title 
VI.74 While on certiorari to the Supreme Court, however, Pennsylvania 
withdrew the challenged permits.75 The Supreme Court dismissed the 
case as moot and vacated the Third Circuit's decision,76 leaving the 
lower courts to continue in their almost universal trend of finding 
implied rights of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations 
promulgated under Title VI.77 
b. South Camden I: The Last Court Victory for EPA's Disparate-Impact 
Regulations 
The next significant case to imply a private right of action to enforce 
EPA's disparate-impact regulations-significant because it was the last-
also emerged from the Third Circuit. 78 South Camden Citizens in Action v. 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (South Camden 1)79 in-
volved a particularly weighty illustration of disparate-impact discrimina-
tion. The complaint arose from the granting of a Clean Air Act permit to 
the St. Lawrence Cement Company (SLC) to operate a cement plant in 
the Waterfront South neighborhood of Camden.so Out of the 2132 per-
72 Id. at 929-33. 
73 Id. at 933-36. This test was built upon the Supreme Court's test for locating implied 
causes of action within statutes-the familiar Cort test. Id.; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-85 
(1975). 
74 Chester Residents COllce1'1ledjor Quality Living, 132 F.3d 925,937 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated 
as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998). 
75 Core, supra note 18, at 206 (2002). 
76 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 524 U.S. 974, 974 (1998). 
77 See Core, supra note 18, at 205 & n.86 (citing cases also finding an implied right of 
action, both within and outside of the environmental justice context); see, e.g., Powell v. 
Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999). 
78 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.NJ. 
2001) [South Camdenl]. Five days later, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval indi-
rectly denied the South Camden I plaintiffs the only theory of their case by ruling upon an 
unrelated action also involving an implied cause of action asserted under the Department 
of Justice'S own disparate-impact regulations. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 
(2001). 
79 South Camden 1, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
80 Id. at 450--52. 
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sons living in Waterfront South, 91% were minorities-63% African-
American, 28% Hispanic.8! Additionally, over half the residents in Water-
front South lived at or below the federal poverty line-the median 
household inc.ome in Waterfront South was $15,082.82 At the time the 
permit was granted, the tiny minority neighborhood was already home to 
five EPA-permitted industries, two Superfund sites, four sites suspected of 
releasing hazardous substances and was being investigated by EPA for 
possible addition to the Superfund list, and fifteen other contaminated 
sites as identified by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Pro-
tection (NJDEP).83 Not surprisingly, the residents of Waterfront South 
suffer alarmingly poor health.84 
Within this milieu, the permit granted to SLC allowed the plant 
to emit into the air cement dust, mercury, lead, manganese, nitrogen 
oxides, carbon monoxide, sulphur oxides, and volatile organic com-
pounds.85 Although the permitted amounts of each of these hazard-
ous substances met EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards,86 
testimony accepted into evidence indicated that due to the cumulative 
impact of the multiple permitted facilities in the Waterfront South 
neighborhood, addition of the new cement plant would increase the 
overall death rate, among other deleterious health effects, by at least 
1.2%, and among individuals already suffering from cardiovascular 
and respiratory disease, by at least 1.6%.87 
The court made two primary findings in granting plaintiff's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction and vacating NJDEP's issuance of 
permits to SLC: (1) NJDEP's failure to consider evidence beyond 
SLC's compliance with technical emissions limitations, such as the 
totality of the circumstances within which the plant would operate-
namely, the racial composition of the neighborhood and environ-
mental burden already carried by the neighborhood-alone consti-
tuted a violation of EPA's Title VI regulations;88 and (2) the citizens 
had established a prima facie case of disparate-impact discrimination 
based on race and national origin-a violation of 40 c.F.R. § 7.35 (b) 
for which they had standing to sue.89 
81 [d. 
82 [d. at 459. 
83 [d. at 450-52, 459-60. 
84 See id. at 450-52, 460-61. 
85 South Camden l, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 450-52. 
86 [d. at 461. 
87 [d. at 461-68. 
88 [d. at 481; see id. at 474-81 (reasoning of the court). 
89 [d. at 495; see id. at 481-97 (reasoning of the court). 
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In reaching this decision, the district court first reiterated the 
Third Circuit's holdings in Chester Residents and Powell v. RidgtfJo that an 
implied private right of action existed to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated by EPA, and accordingly considered itself 
bound by these decisions.91 The Camden I court, however, made this 
declaration of staTe decisis with an eye toward the future, noting that a 
pending Supreme Court decision could potentially overturn its ruling 
and earlier circuit court precedent allowing implied private rights of 
action under 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) .92 Indeed, five days later, the Su-
preme Court in AlexandeT v. Sandoval swept the legs out from under-
neath the Third Circuit's decision.93 
c. Sandoval Closes Avenues JOT Private RedTess oj Disparate-Impact Dis-
Climination 
Sandoval turned a significant amount of persuasive circuit court 
precedent on its head when it held that private individuals may not 
sue to enforce disparate-impact regulations.94 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the 5-4 majority, began with a reiteration of what the previous line 
of Supreme Court Title VI cases had thus far proclaimed: (1 ) 
"[p]rivate individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain 
both injunctive relief and damages";95 and (2) "§ 601 prohibits only 
intentional discrimination.''96 The Court then went on to note that it 
had never held that a private right of action existed to enforce dispa-
rate-impact regulations.97 
Examining the question then as an issue of first impression, the 
Court first rebutted the argument that just because a private right of 
action exists to enforce Title VI's section 601 prohibition against in-
tentional discrimination, then by extension, a private right of action 
must exist to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under 
90 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999). 
91 South Camden 1,145 F. Supp. 2d at 473-74. 
92 See id. 
93 Alexandel' v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
94Id. 
95 Id. at 279-80 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979». 
96Id. at 280-81 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardians Ass'n 
v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 (1983); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978». 
97 Id. at 282-84 (clarifYing the holdings of Cannon and Guardians Association, which re-
spondents assert had established a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regu-
lations). "Neither [Guardians Association], nor any other [case] in this Court, has held that 
the private right of action exists." Id. at 284. 
I 
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the command of section 602.98 The Court reasoned that it could not 
make this assumption because "disparate-impact regulations do not 
simply apply § 601-since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 per-
mits99-and therefore [it is] clear that the private right of action to 
enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regula-
tions."loo Therefore, the only remaining statutory source from which 
an implied right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations 
could arise would be section 602.101 
Turning then to the text and structure of section 602, the Court 
searched to see whether Congress intended to create a private right of 
action to enforce section 602.102 The search of section 602 "reveal[ed] 
no congressional intent to create a private right of action."103 The im-
plicit reasoning was twofold. First, section 602 contains no "rights cre-
ating language. "104 Whereas section 601 speaks directly of the persons 
it intends to benefit, "[section 602] focuses neither on the individuals 
protected nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on 
the agencies that will do the regulating. "105 Such statutes that are 
"twice removed" create "no implication of an intent to confer rights 
on a particular class of persons. "106 Second, the Court found that the 
administrative methods section 602 provides for enforcing regulations 
promulgated thereunder manifest a lack of congressional intent to 
98Id. at 284-86. 
99 This, and other comments in Sandoval, indicate the Supreme Court's unspoken view 
that disparate-impact regulations are not authorized under Title VI. See John Arthur Lau-
fer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1613, 1628-41 (2002) (explaining how SandovaCs "unofficial holding" was to in-
( validate disparate-impact regulations as beyond agency authority under Title VI). But see 
b discussion i1lfra Part III. 
100 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285. 
fe 101 [d. at 286 ("[The right to enforce disparate-impact regulations] must come, if at all, 
from the independen t force of § 602."). 
sil 102 [d. at 288 ("We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Con-
Uf, gress's intent with the text and structure of Title VI."). The dissent notes that this ap-
tel proach ignores the more searching four factor test the Court outlined in Cort v. Ash and 
/d. used in that case, and several subsequent, to determine when it is appropriate to imply a 
private right of action from a statute. [d. at 311-12 (Stevens,]., dissenting); see also Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-85 (1975). 
Cit) 103 [d. at 289 ("Far from displaying congressional intent to create new rights, § 602 lim-
its agencies to 'effectuat[ingl' rights already created by § 601."). 
104 See id. at 288. 
105 See id. at 289. 
106 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 
(1981». 
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create a private remedy.107 As such, because a regulation cannot create 
a private right of action not contemplated by its authorizing statute, 
there exists no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated under section 602.108 
d. South Camden II and III: § 1983 Cannot Operate as an End-Run 
Around Sandoval 
The Court's unrelated decision in Sandoval implicitly overruled 
the decision reached five days earlier in South Camden L109 The hereto-
fore unanswered question had been resolved: private parties cannot 
bring suit to enforce Title VI disparate-impact regulations. llo Still un-
resolved, however, was the question of whether a suit could be 
brought against state actors under § 1983,1ll under the theory that 
failure to abide by federal disparate-impact regulations is a prohibited 
deprivation of rights secured by federal law. In the afternoon of the 
day that Sandoval was decided, the South Camden I district judge asked 
the South Camden Citizens and NJDEP to brief that very question,1l2 
and then ruled in South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (South Camden 11) that § 1983 did, in-
deed, provide relief for a violation of EPA's disparate-impact regula-
tions. 1l3 
As an initial matter, the district court reasoned that Sandoval had 
not foreclosed the possibility of asserting a § 1983 claim for denial of 
107 Id. at 289-90. "The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule 
suggests that Congress intended to preclude others." Id. at 290. 
108 Id. at 291 ("[I] t is most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can 
conjure up a private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies 
may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."). 
109 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293. 
110 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 
(D.NJ. 2001) [South Camden II]. 
III 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 
Id. Justice Stevens in his dissent in Sandoval had raised the possibility of private parties 
using the express cause of action created by Congress in § 1983 to seek redress for viola-
tions of section 602 regulations. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
112 South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 509. 
113Id. 
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rights secured by EPA's regulations because Sandoval had not 
specifically addressed that question or held otherwise.1I4 The court 
then went on to explain that in order to determine whether § 1983 was 
available to remedy a statutory violation, the plaintiff must "assert the 
violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. "115 In 
determining whether federal statutes create individual rights, courts 
typically apply the three-part analysis articulated in Blessing v. FTee-
stone.1I6 Here, however, before being able to focus the Blessing test on an 
agency regulation, the court first had to address the threshold question 
of whether agencies are even capable of independently creating 
rights. 11 7 According to the holding in Wright v. City of Roanoke and its 
progeny, the court reasoned that agencies were indeed capable of cre-
ating rights through their rule-making power. lIB Turning then to a 
Blessing analysis of EPA's section 602 regulations-and treating them as 
if they were statutes1l9-the court held that they created a personal 
right to be free from disparate-impact discrimination. 12o Accordingly, 
NJDEP's failure to abide by EPA's disparate-impact regulations created 
a deprivation of this right, and was therefore actionable under 
§ 1983.121 
This victory was short lived, however, as the Third Circuit quickly 
reversed the district court's decision and held that Sandoval had im-
plicitly foreclosed the use of § 1983 to enforce EPA's disparate-impact 
regulations. 122 As an initial matter, the court distinguished Wright as 
involving a regulation that merely defined the specific right that Con-
gress had already conferred via statute.123 Accordingly, the determina-
tion of whether a regulation contains a right enforceable under 
1H See id. at 513-19. The court undertook an examination of what Sandoval did and 
did not hold with Justice Scalia's "admonition" clearly in mind that courts are "bound by 
holdings, not language." Id. at 513. 
115 Id. at 519 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citation omit-
ted)) . 
116Id. The three parts of the Blessing test are: (1) congressional intent that the provi-
sion benefit the plaintiff; (2) demonstration that the right assertedly protected by the stat-
ute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial compe-
tence; and (3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. 
Id. (citing Blessing. 520 U.S. at 340-41). 
117 Id. at 526. 
118 South Camden II, 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 526-30 (D.NJ. 2001) (discussing Wright v. 
City of Roanoke, 479 U.S. 418, 419-32 (1987)). 
119 Id. at 535-47. 
12°Id. at 549. 
121ld. 
122 South Camde1l III, 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001). 
123Id. at 782-83 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 430-31 & n.ll). 
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§ 1983 turns upon the question of whether that right had originally 
been created by statute, not whether the regulation itself creates the 
right according to a Blessinganalysis.124 
U sing Sandoval as a guide, the court then examined whether sec-
tion 602 creates a right against disparate-impact discrimination.125 
Quoting Sandoval, the court stated, "§ 602 limits agencies to 'effec-
tuat[ing]' rights already created by § 601."126 Therefore, the court 
reasoned that since Sandoval had already determined that the only 
right conferred by section 601 was a right to be free from intentional 
discrimination, section 602 did not create an additional right to be 
free from disparate-impact discrimination.127 "Accordingly," the court 
wrote, "if there is to be a privately enforceable right under Title VI to 
be free from disparate-impact discrimination, Congress, and not an 
administrative agency ... must create this right. "128 
II. EXAMINING THE VALIDITY OF EPA's DISPARATE-IMPACT 
REGULATIONS 
Even though the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed 
whether 40 c.F.R. § 7.35(b) creates an enforceable right under § 1983,129 
many commentators have viewed Akxander v. Sandoval and South Camden 
124 See id. at 782-83, 788-91. 
125 See id. at 788-91. 
126 See id. at 789 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001». 
127 See id. at 789-91. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Sandoval, disagreed with this narrow 
reading of section 602's language. See infra note 292. 
128 South Camden III, 274 F.3d at 790. This holding echoes language found in Sandoval: 
"[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through 
statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not." Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001). 
129 As mentioned, however, in note 25, supra, a recent Supreme Court decision outside 
the Title VI context has effectively foreclosed § 1983 enforcement of any "right" to be free 
from disparate-impact discrimination. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282-86 
(2002). The Gonzaga Court, in ruling that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act's 
nondisclosure provisions did not establish an individual right enforceable through § 1983, 
held the following: "[w]e now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an 
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983." Id. at 
283. The Court also held that, "the initial inquiry-determining whether a statute confers 
any right at all-is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case, 
the express purpose of which is to determine whether or not a statute 'confer[s] rights on 
a particular class of persons.'" Id. at 285 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 
294 (1981». Gonzaga thereby implicitly validated the Third Circuit's approach of relying 
upon the Sandoval analysis in its search for § 1983 enforceable Title VI rights. See discus-
sion supra Part I.B.2.d. 
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III as having signaled the end of private Title VI disparate-impact litiga-
tion. 130 
Assuming arguendo that the courts have been closed to private liti-
gants seeking enforcement of EPA's disparate-impact regulations, there 
still exist extrajudicial means of leveraging these regulations for the 
benefit of minority communities. Most clearly, administrative redress 
through OCR, while ineffective in the past, still remains a potential 
source of empowerment. For example, former Administrator Christine 
Todd Whitman has signaled EPA's renewed commitment to Environ-
mental Justice. 131 Time will tell what effect this reaffirmation will have 
upon the future of the OCR complaint process. In the meantime, 
scholars have begun to seek alternative and novel applications for EPA's 
disparate-impact regulations. 132 
But before EPA's section 602 regulations can be useful to anyone 
in any context, it is necessary to explore in detail the threshold issue 
ignored by the previous line of cases: whether EPA's disparate-impact 
regulations are in and of themselves valid law. In other words, does 
EPA have the legal authority to terminate a recipient's funding under 
40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) if that recipient has used "criteria or methods of 
130 See Lisa S. Core. supra note 18, at 239-42. 
131 See Kevin A. Gaynor & Benjamin S. Lippard, Environmental Enforcement: Industry 
Should Not Be Complacent, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,488, 10,501-02 (Apr., 2002) 
(noting that in the summer of 2001, Administrator Whitman created a special task force 
within the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance to address OCR's backlog of 
Title VI complaints). 
132 In particular, two articles have recently noted that section 110(a) (2) (E) of the 
Clean Air Act raises potentially sweeping environmental justice permitting implications. 
George Hays & Nadia Wetzler, Federal Recognition of Variances: A Window into the Turbulent 
Relationship Between Science and Law Under the Clean Air Act, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 115, 
126-27 (1998); Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into EPA 
Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 632-33 (1999). Section 110 governs the submis-
sion of state implementation plans (SIPs) to the EPA, and describes the minimum re-
quirements that each SIP must meet in order to receive EPA approval. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 741O(a)(2) (E) (2000). Section 110(a) (2)(E) requires that each SIP shall ·provide neces-
sary assurances that the state ... is not prohibited by any provision of Federal or State law 
from carrying out such implementation plan or portion thereof." Id. Lazarus and Tai 
write: 
To the extent that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act constitutes "any provision of 
Federal ... law" within the meaning of Section 11O(a) (2) (E), this CAA provi-
sion may provide EPA with both authority and responsibility to ensure that 
SIPs, including their permitting provisions, do not result in the kind of dispa-
rate environmental results Title VI condemns. 
Lazarus & Tai, supra, at 633 (emphasis added). 
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administering its program which have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination"?133 
The validity of all administrative agency disparate-impact regula-
tions have heretofore been largely justified on the basis of now ques-
tionable readings of GuaTdians Association v. Civil Service Commission 
and Alexander v. Choate.134 The Court in Sandoval has dismissed these 
readings, and implicitly called into doubt whether disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI are valid exercises of 
administrative discretion.135 Accordingly, because the validity of dispa-
rate-impact regulations can no longer be supported by prior case 
law,136 all that remains as a means of evaluating their validity is an in-
dependent analysis according to basic principles of administrative law. 
It is to this discussion that we now turn. 
A. Judicial Review oj Administrative InterpTetations-The Chevron 
Two-Step Analysis 
ChevTOn U.S.A. v. Natural Resources DeJense Council 137 is a watershed 
case138 that stands for the principal of judicial deference to reasonable 
administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 139 ChevTOn U.S.A. 
arose out of a dispute concerning EPA's definition of the statutory 
term "stationary source" contained within the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977.140 The original Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 estab-
133 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2002). 
134 See, e.g., Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Public Wrongs, Private Rights: Private Attorneys General 
for Civil Rights, 9 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 321, 326-27 (1998); Barry E. Hill, ChestC/; Pennsylvania-
Was It a Classic Example of EnvironmentalInjusticer, 23 VT. L. REV. 479, 507-16 (2000); Mank, 
supra note 44, at 12-16 (illustrating some pre-Sandoval readings of Guardians Association 
and Choate, offered to support the validity of disparate-impact regulations). 
135 See infra notes 206, 230 and accompanyiug text. 
136 See discussion infra Part lILA. 
137 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
138 The test that Chevron elucidated was not new, but firmly rooted in long established 
precedent. See id. at 843-46 & nn.12-14. Specifically, the Court noted that, "[tj he principle 
of deference to admiuistrative iuterpretations 'has been consistently followed by this Court 
whenever decision as to the meaniug or reach of a statute has involved reconciling 
conflictiug policies ..... " Id. at 844. Further, "'[ijf this choice represents a reasonable 
accommodation of conflictiug policies that were committed to the agency's care by the 
statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history 
that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned"" Id. at 845 
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961». 
139 See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-44. 
140 Id. at 839. 
2004] Environmental Justice & Title W 79 
lished a cooperative federal-state enforcement framework that re-
mains in effect today.l41 
In 1977, faced with nonattainment of the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) in several states, Congress passed the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977.142 Section 172(b) (6)143 of the amend-
ments directed every state to create a State Implementation Plan (SIP) 
requiring every new "major stationary source" in a nonattainment area 
to receive a permit for construction and operation that certified the satis-
faction of a set of stringen t emissions criteria designed to bring the state' s 
air quality into NAAQS thresholds. 144 The source of the controversy, 
however, was that the statute did not define the meaning of the term 
"major stationary source" as found in section 172 (b)(6),l45 Accordingly, 
in 1981, EPA chose to define the term according to a "bubble con-
cept"146 The bubble concept treated all pollutant-emitting activities be-
longing to a single industrial grouping and located on contiguous or ad-
jacent property as a single "stationary source" for purposes of the section 
172(b) (6) requirements.l47 Under this plant-wide definition of "station-
141 [d. at 845-49. In brief: section 109 of the CAA directs EPA to promulgate National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for a wide variety of pollutants based upon the 
maximum levels of each that are safe for human health. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000). Section 
llO then delegates to the states the responsibility of assuring that each NAAQS is met 
within its own borders. [d. § 7410. States do this by implementing a State Implementation 
Plan (SIP) that, inter alia, regulates via permit how much of particular pollutants given 
industries can emit in different regions of the state. [d. States are delegated broad discre-
tion in how they go about achieving the NAAQSs, but ultimately, each SIP must be ap-
proved by EPA as technically capable of meeting the NAAQSs, and additionally, must op-
erate in accordance with all other requirements of the CAA and federal law. [d. 
§ 741O(a)(2). In addition to this basic structure, section III further requires that major 
new stationary sources of pollution emit no more than the lowest emissions rate that is 
achieyable using the best available technology (BAT), and delegates to EPA responsibility 
for creating a list of "major stationary sources" and the new source performance standards 
(NSPS) by which they must abide. [d. § 7411. 
142 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977); see 
ChevlVlI U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 848-49. 
143 Currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6); Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 849-50. 
144 These stringent emissions criteria were contained in section 173 of the amend-
ments, and are currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7503. Specifically, new stationary sources 
within a nonattainment area must meet lowest achievable emission rates (LAER), which 
are more stringent than the NSPS standards which mandate BAT for new stationary 
sources within attainment areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501 (3), 7503 (a) (2). 
145 Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 851. 
146 [d. at 839-41,857-59. 
147 The bubble concept was implicitly created by EPA definitions of two ambiguous 
statutory terms. ·'Stationary source' means any building, structure, facility, or installation 
which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.01 (a) (1983). "'Building, structure, facility, or installation' means all of the pollutant-
emitting activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or 
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ary source," an existing plant that contained several pollution-emitting 
devices is able to install or modifY one piece of equipment without meet-
ing the permit conditions of section 172(b) (6) so long as such 
modification does not result in a net increase in overall emissions from 
the plant.148 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged149 
EPA's "bubble concept" definition of "stationary source" as contrary 
to the purpose of the nonattainment program, which was to bring the 
air quality of non attainment regions within NAAQS thresholds. 15o The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with NRDC, first 
deciding that (l) the statute "does not explicitly define what Congress 
envisioned as a 'stationary source ... "'; and (2) the precise issue was 
not "squarely addressed in the legislative history. "151 Accordingly, the 
court of appeals reasoned that "the purposes of the nonattainment 
program should guide" their decision.152 In the court's view, this pur-
pose was to improve air quality.153 In light of earlier precedent, the 
court stated that the bubble concept was appropriate for programs 
designed to maintain air quality, but was inappropriate for a program 
designed to improve air quality.154 
On review, the Supreme Court laid out the now familiar" Chevron 
two-step" analysis.155 To properly review an agency's regulation for va-
lidity, the court must ask two questions.156 First, has Congress directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue?157 If the intent of Congress is 
clear and unambiguously expressed, the court and agency are re-
quired to give it effect, and cannot impose their own construction.158 
more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same person (or 
persons under common control) .... " 40 C.F.R. § 51 (j)(I)(ii) (1983). 
148 Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 840. A stationary source is considered modified only if 
such modification results in an increase in emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(4). Therefore, since 
an entire plant is considered a stationary source, if one component within the plaut has an 
increase in emissions, but there are equivalent offsetting reductions elsewhere in the plant, 
the entire stationary source (i.e. the plant) has not been modified, and will not fall under the 
permitting requirements of section 172(b) (6), currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6). 
149 The challenge was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1). 
150 See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 859-66 (respondent's argument on appeal). 
151 Id. at 841 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) ). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 841-42. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 842-43. 
156 Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. at 842-43. 
2004] Envinmmental Justice & Title VI 81 
If, however, a court determines that the statute is "silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue" -or stated otherwise, that "Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue"-the court 
may not impose its own construction on the statute as it would in the 
absence of administrative interpretation.159 Instead, the court must 
move to the second step of the test and ask whether the agency regu-
lation is a "permissible construction" of the statutory ambiguity.loo If 
the answer returned is yes, then the court is required to give the regu-
lation deference.161 In deciding what constitutes a "permissible con-
struction," the court does not have to agree with the construction 
employed by the agency, or find that the construction was the only 
one that could have been adopted-the construction need only be 
reasonable.162 
Applying the above test, the Court examined both the language of 
the statute and the legislative history, and concluded that the statute 
was silent as to the precise definition of "stationary source" and that 
Congress had not addressed the precise definition of the term in either 
floor or committee proceedings)63 Accordingly, the first step of the 
Chevron test was met: the intent of Congress as to the precise definition 
of "stationary source" had not been clearly and unambiguously ex-
pressed.164 Moving then to the second step of the test, the Court exam-
ined tlle competing policy interests of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
as identified in the legislative history-economic growth and environ-
mental protection-and reasoned that EPA's interpretation of "station-
ary source" was a "permissible construction" in light of the competing 
policy choices between environmental protection and economic 
growth.165 As evidence of this fact, the Court noted that EPA's construc-
tion was supported by a reasonable belief that the regulation served 
both policy interests, pointing to EPA's rulemaking record, and several 
private studies contained therein.166 It was in this second step that the 
159 [d. at 843. Indeed, this is the very error committed by the court of appeals: "The ba-
sic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial definition of the term 
'stationary source' when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that 
definition." [d. 
160 [d. ("The question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute."). 
161 [d. at 843-44. 
162 See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843 n.ll. 
165 [d. at 848-53, 859-64. 
164 See id. at 842-43. The court below had also correctly arrived at this conclusion. See 
id. at 841 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Crr. 1982». 
165 See id. at 863-65. 
166 See id. 
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court of appeals had erred, by second guessing the wisdom of EPA's 
construction, rather than simply examining the reasonableness of EPA's 
view that its construction was permissible in the overall context of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments. 167 
B. Refining the Chevron Two-Step Analysis 
1. Chevron Step One 
In determining whether Congress has expressed its clear and un-
ambiguous intent, or if the statute is instead silent or ambiguous with 
respect to a particular question, Chevmn U.S.A. directs that the "tradi-
tional tools of statutory interpretation" are to be used.168 An over-
whelming number of cases has helped define what these tools are, 
and how courts use them. 169 Four of these cases are included for the 
purposes of this Note. 
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon 
(Sweet Home),170 the Supreme Court did not explicitly address Chevmn 
step one,171 but did engage in a thorough application of the traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation that Chevmn U.S.A. directs are to be 
167 See id. at 845 ("[T]he question before [the court] was not whether in its view the 
[bubble] concept is 'inappropriate' in the general context of a program designed to im-
prove air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context 
ofthis particular program is a reasonable one."). 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision ... cen-
ters on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reason-
able choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail .... 
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and re-
solving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not 
judicial ones .... 
Id. at 866. 
168 Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; STEPHEN G. BRYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND REGULATORY POLICY 319 (5th ed. 2002). 
169 To be more exact, "overwhelming" translates into almost 7000 cases-the number 
of federal court decisions that have cited Chevron U.S.A. as of December 2001. BRYER ET 
AL., supra note 168, at 289. 
170 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
171 See id. at 703-04. The Court implicitly held that the statute is ambiguous by stating: 
"Congress did not unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt respondents' view ... ." Id. 
The Court, however, did not engage in application of the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation to decide this fact, so much as it used those tools to decide that the Secre-
tary's definition was a reasonable construction of the statute (Chevron step two). See id. at 
697, 704. Whatever the correct reading of Sweet Home's reasoning, the case nonetheless 
serves as an illustration of the tools that are to be used in Chevron step one. See BRYER ET 
AL., SlIpra note 168, at 319,363. 
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used in step one.172 Sweet Home was concerned with resolving the issue 
of whether the Secretary of the Interior's definition of the Endangered 
Species Act's (ESA) prohibition of "harm," as including indirect, unin-
tentional harm resulting from "significant habitat modification," was 
within his authority under the ESA173 In holding that the Secretary's 
interpretation of the text was reasonable, the Court relied on three 
sources of support: (1) the ordinary understanding of the term in 
question as illustrated by dictionary definitions;l74 (2) the underlying 
purpose of the statute;175 and (3) subsequent legislative action indicat-
ing congressional acquiescence to the Secretary's then-existing inter-
pretation.176 Furthermore, the Court found additional support from 
the legislative history of the Act for its conclusion that the Secretary's 
definition rested on a permissible construction ofthe ESA177 
An earlier case, MCI Telecommunications Cmp. v. Amelican Telephone 
& Telegraph CO.,178 further explored the use of dictionary definitions 
in statutory interpretation. The dispute centered on the Communica-
tion Act's phrase "modifY any requirement."179 The Federal Commu-
nications Commission interpreted this phrase, relying on a single di-
vergent dictionary definition, as giving it the authority to completely 
exempt any long-distance carrier from the Communications Act's tar-
iff requirements. 180 The Court reasoned that statutory ambiguity 
might exist when a selection between widely accepted alternative dic-
tionary meanings can be made. 181 Ambiguity is not created, however, 
in cases where the word in question is defined in a single, uniform 
manner in several dictionaries, and exists in only one dictionary with 
multiple alternative meanings.182 In such a situation, absent contrary 
indications provided by other tools of statutory construction, the 
meaning of the term is held to be that of universal dictionary usage, 
and agency deference is not appropriate.183 
172 Sec Sweet Home Chapter ofCmfys. for a Great 01:, 515 U.S. at 697-708. 
173 !d. at 690. 
174 Id. at 697-98. 
mId. at 698-700. 
176 See id. at 700-01. 
177 Id. at 704-08. 
178 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
179 Id. at 220. 
180 Id. at 220, 225-26. 
181 Id. at 227. 
182 See id. at 225-28. 
183 Sec id. 
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In Food & Dmg Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 184 
the Court elaborated on the third tool of statutory construction used 
in Sweet Home-namely, subsequent legislative action-to find that 
Congress did not intend to grant the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products. lSS The Court con-
cluded that FDA authority to regulate tobacco would be inconsistent 
with the overall regulatory scheme established by the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, as well as with subsequent tobacco-specific legislation 
enacted by Congress.1OO The Court relied upon previous cases that 
had held that, "the meaning of one statute may be affected by other 
Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more 
specifically to the topic at hand. "187 The Court also drew upon a fun-
damental canon of statutory construction, "that the words of a statute 
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme. "188 
A set of tools similar to those used in Sweet Home were used in an 
earlier D.C. Circuit case, also involving environmental regulation. In 
American Mining Congress v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agentry,l89 petitioners argued that EPA's redefinition of "solid waste," 
asserting Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) jurisdic-
tion over secondary materials reused within an ongoing industrial 
production process, was beyond EPA's statutory authority.19o In review-
ing RCRA, the court found that Congress had clearly expressed an 
intent that the statutory term "solid waste ... be limited to materials 
that are 'discarded' by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or 
thrown away" and therefore, the challenged regulations were beyond 
statutory authority.191 The court arrived at this conclusion by utilizing 
four tools of statutory construction: (1) the language of the statute;192 
184 Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
185 See id. at 133. 
186 See id. 
187Id. (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1998); United 
Statesv. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988». 
188 See id. (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989». 
1119 Am. Mining Congo V. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
190 Id. at 1178. 
191 Id. at 1193. 
192 Id. at 1183-85. "The starting point in every case involving statutory construction is 
'the language employed by Congress.'" Id. at 1183 (quoting CBS V. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 377 
(1981». 
2004] EnvimnmentalJustice & Title VI 85 
(2) the underlying purposes of the statute;193 (3) other provisions of 
the statute;194 and (4) the legislative history ofthe statute.195 
2. Chevron Step Two 
It is an almost universal assumption in administrative law that if a 
regulation passes Chevron step one, then the agency will undoubtedly 
prevail on step twO.196 Step one is where the battle occurs-to date, no 
Supreme Court decision has invalidated an agency rule on the ground 
that it fails step two by being an impermissible construction of an am-
biguous statute.197 
A number of circuit courts, however, have overturned agency 
rulemakings as violative of step twO.198 There are two competing con-
ceptions of the scope of judicial review under step two, and are be-
yond the discussion of this Note. 199 For the limited purposes here, 
however, it will be assumed that a future court inquiry into the validity 
of EPA's disparate-impact regulations will effectively begin and end 
with the decision that Title VI is ambiguous as to the meaning of "dis-
crimination"-EPA passes step one, or alternatively, that the statute 
clearly expresses a congressional intent to limit the reach of Title VI 
to acts of intentional discrimination-EPA fails step one.200 
193Id. at 1185-87. The court turned to this tool after expressing hesitance to "attribute 
decisive significance to the ordinary meaning of statutory language." [d. at 1184. Rather, 
the court accorded considerable, but not conclusive weight to the plain meaning of the 
statutory term "discarded." Id. at 1185. 
194 [d. at 1187-89. "[W] e do not ... construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read 
statutes as a whole." Id. at 1187 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)). 
Further, the court added that "the structure of a statute, in short, is important in the sensi-
tive task of divining Congress's meaning." Id. 
195 Am. Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1190-93. The court, however, offers the proviso that 
legislative history is only useful in determining congressional intent in the presence of 
statu tory ambiguity, and that where the statute itself is clear, legislative history bears weigh t 
only in the exceptional circumstances where the history clearly expresses an intent con-
trary to its language. [d. at 1190. 
195 See BRYER ET AL., supra note 168, at 290. 
197Id. 
198Id. at 290, 395-96. 
199 Id. at 395-96. 
200 For one possible Chevron step-two analysis of 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), see Note, After 
Sandoval.·Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title W Enforcement, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1774, 1783-85 (2003). 
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III. ANALYSIS: EPA's DISPARATE-IMPACT REGULATIONS ARE A VALID 
EXERCISE OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY UNDER TITLE VI 
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
Before undertaking a ChevTOn201 analysis of EPA's disparate-impact 
regulations, the heretofore unrealized necessity of doing so requires 
elucidation.202 Despite many scholars' pre-Sandoval assertions to the 
contrary,203 it is no longer sufficient to rest the validity of Title VI dispa-
rate-impact regulations upon dicta announced in Guaniians Association 
v. Civil Service Commission204 and Alexander v. Choat~05 given Alexander v. 
Sandovafs thinly veiled hostility toward administrative assertions of 
authority to prohibit disparate impacts under sanction of Title VI.206 
201 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
202Justice Stevens, dissenting in Sandoval, however, did point to the fact that a Chevron 
analysis would properly resolve the question of Title VI's scope. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 309-10 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). At least one case prior to Sandoval 
also noted the importance of Chevron U.S.A. in resolving the question of Title VI's scope. 
Harris v.James, 127 F.3d 993,1010 (11th Cir. 1997) ("determining the validity of the [dis-
parate impact] regulation would require application of the analysis set out in [Chevron 
U.S.A.] "). Yet surprisingly, the author can find no cases that have actually set out to per-
form this analysis. A few scholars, however, have undertaken a Chevron analysis of Title VI. 
Barry Hill, supra note 134, at 507-16, was perhaps one of the first scholars to make such an 
attempt. His analysis, however, does not specifically employ the tools of statutory construc-
tion courts have used in performing Chevron analyses. Hill, supra note 134, at 507-09; supra 
Part II.B.1. Hill treats step two more extensively, but relies heavily upon the very line of 
cases subsequently called into question by SandovaL See id. at 509-16; Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 
281-82. A later, post-Sandoval student piece, offers a brief step-one analysis, and a step-two 
analysis rooted in caselaw-independent policy rationales. See Note, supra note 200, at 1782-
85. 
203 See supra note 134 (giving examples of literature that have used Guardians Associa-
tion and Choate in support of the proposition that disparate-impact regulations are valid 
exercises of administrative authority under Title VI). 
204 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
205 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1988). 
206 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282 ("These statements [in Guardians Association and Choate 
that regulations promulgated under § 602 may validly proscribe activities having a dispa-
rate impact on racial groups] are in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and 
Guardians that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination .... "); infra Part III.A. In a 
footnote responding to the dissent's argument for the validity of disparate-impact regula-
tions, Sandoval offers more proof of the majority's unspoken invalidation of disparate-
impact regulations: "[w]e cannot help observing, however, how strange it is to say that 
disparate-impact regulations are 'inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably intertwined 
with § 601' ... when § 601 permits the very behavior that the regulations forbid." [d. at 286 
n.6; see also Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate bnpact Suits, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 1155, 1210-18 (2000) (arguing in accord with Sandoval that Bakke'indicates congres-
sional intent to limit Title VI to a prohibition of discrimination that would violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, i.e. intentional discrimination, and therefore, according to the 
holding in Chevron U.S.A., any regulation promulgated under Title VI must also be limited 
to prohibiting intentional discrimination); Laufer, supra note 99, at 1628-41 (2002) (ex-
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On the other side of the argument, it is likewise insufficient to rely 
upon dicta announced in Regents of the University of California v. Baklu!07 
as a basis for concluding that Congress had announced its intent to 
limit Title VI's reach to acts of intentional discrimination.208 
A. The Supreme Court Has Never Decided the Issue of 
Disparate-Impact Regulation Validity 
Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court has directly and 
conclusively resolved the issue of the validity of section 602 disparate-
impact regulations. 209 There have been, however, several judicial opin-
ions offered on the issue, most notably in Guardians Association21O and 
Choate,211 that create the impression that the debate has been firmly 
resolved.212 Yet in reality, neither the Guardians Association nor Choate 
Courts actually answered the question of regulatory validity.213 For ex-
ample, in Guardians Association, five justices, including the lead author 
of the court's opinion, Justice White, offered statements that agency 
regulations may properly forbid disparate-impact discrimination.214 
Justice White's statement, however, that "Title VI [regulations] 
reach[] unintentional, disparate impact discrimination as well as de-
liberate racial discrimination "215 was not necessary to his affirmance 
of the lower court's denial of compensatory relief.216 Instead, he 
affirmed the lower court on the independent theory that Title VI can 
only provide compensatory relief when a showing of intentional dis-
plaining in detail the origins of Sandovafs "unofficial holding" that invalidates disparate-
impact regulations as beyond agency authority under Title VI). 
207 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
208 See infra Part III.B. But see Lambert, supra note 206, at 1210-18. 
209 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82 ("Though no opinion of this Court has held that 
[regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities 
having a disparate impact on racial groups], five Justices in Guardians voiced that view of 
the law at least as alternative grounds for their decisions, and dictum in Alexander v. Choate 
is to the same effect.") (emphasis added). 
210 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 583-607 (1983) (White, 
].); id. at 615-35 (Marshall,]., dissenting); id. at 635-45 (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
2ll See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1988). 
212 See supra note 134. Commentators have traditionally relied upon the "holdings" of 
these cases to support the validity of disparate-impact regulations. See supra note 134 (giv-
ing examples of literature that have used Guardians and Choate in support of the proposi-
tion that disparate-impact regulations are valid exercises of administrative authority under 
Title VI). 
213 See Lambert, supra note 206, at 1203-09. 
214 See inji'O Part III.B. But see Lambert, supra note 206, at 1210-18. 
215 Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592-93. 
216Id. at 607; see Lambert, supra note 206, at 1206. 
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crimination is made.217 Therefore, Justice White's opinion on the va-
lidity of disparate-impact regulations is capable of characterization as 
dicta,218 and even if not dicta, arguably does not constitute the hold-
ing of the Court.219 Nevertheless, a unanimous opinion in Choate later 
interpreted Guardians Association as having declared that, "actions hav-
ing an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities [can] be redressed 
through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of 
Title VI."220 This misinterpretation of Guardians Association can also be 
characterized as dicta, because the strict holding of Choate is limited to 
the decision that Tennessee's reduction in annual inpatient Medicaid 
coverage does not constitute discrimination under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.221 Chester Residents,222 South Camden /,223 and 
all future courts asked to resolve controversies involving disparate-
impact regulations nevertheless accepted this erroneous reading of 
Guardians Association as a basis for rendering their own opinions.224 
But in reality, not a single court to date has in fact been asked to di-
rectly address the specific question of the validity of section 602 dispa-
rate-impact regulations.225 
As further support that the validity issue remains unresolved, 
Sandoval explicitly declared that the Supreme Court had never de-
cided whether or not disparate-impact regulations promulgated un-
der section 602 were valid.226 But even though Sandoval considered 
217 Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 593-607; see Lambert, supra note 206, at 1206. 
218 See Lambert, supra note 206, at 1206 & n.159 (dictum is "[a] judicial comment 
made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the 
decision in the case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered persua-
sive)." (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "obiter dic-
tum")) ). 
219 Lambert, supra note 206, at 1206-07 ("When a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding 
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.'" (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (citation omitted))). 
220 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985). 
221 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001); Lambert, supra note 206, at 
1208. 
222 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("Guardians stands for at least two propositions ... discriminatory effect regulations 
promulgated by agencies pursuant to section 602 are valid exercises of their authority un-
der that section."). 
223 South Camden 1,145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 473-74 (D.NJ. 2001). 
224 Laufer, supra note 99, at 1626 n.71. 
225 Supra note 209. 
226Id. 
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the question open,227 the Court failed to resolve the question. It chose 
instead to assume the validity of the Department of Transportation's 
(DOT) disparate-impact regulations for purposes of deciding the ac-
tual issue presented on certioTmi: whether an implied right of action 
existed to enforce DOT's section 602 regulations.228 
Though Sandoval maintained the appearance of leaving the valid-
ity question unresolved, in light of the entirety of Title VI jurispru-
dence from Bakke to Sandoval, it becomes apparent that the Court is 
extremely suspicious of disparate-impact regulations. 229 It is to be ex-
pected then that at some point a court will be forced to squarely ad-
dress the heretofore avoided question of whether disparate-impact 
regulations are valid exercises of administrative discretion under Title 
VI.230 The implicit reasoning of Sandoval, however, as foreshadowed by 
Lambert and explained by Laufer, is un persuasive and legally in-
sufficient to resolve that question.231 
B. Bakke Does Not Indicate Congressional Intent to Limit the Scope of Title 
VI to Acts of Intentional DisC1imination 
In seeking to summarily invalidate disparate-impact regulations, 
Thomas Lambert has said that "the question of whether Title VI pro-
hibits only intentional discrimination ... is not open; the Bakke Court 
resolved that issue. "232 In Bakke, a fivejustice majority stated that, "in 
view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe 
only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment."233 Two years before Bakke, the Su-
preme Court in Washington v. Davis had held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits only intentional acts of discrimination, and not 
those actions merely having a disparate impact. 234 Therefore, the ar-
227 Laufer, supra note 99, at 1629; Sltpra note 209. 
228 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) ("We must assume for purposes 
of deciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly pro-
scribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities 
are permissible under § 601."). 
229 See Sltpra note 206. 
230 Such a scenario could conceivably occur in the context of an appeal of an EPA 
OCR enforcement action-specifically, a party appealing a finding by OCR that it had 
violated 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) could argue that EPA's disparate-impact regulations are ultra 
vires, as indicated by a simple extension of the reasoning found in Sandoval and explained 
by Laufer. See Laufer, supra note 99, at 1628-41. 
231 See supra note 206 and infra Part III.B. 
232 Lambert, supra note 206, at 1211. 
233 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978). 
234 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.s. 229, 244-48 (1976). 
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gument goes, by expressing its intent to limit the scope of Title VI to 
the Equal Protection Clause, Congress has clearly expressed its intent 
to limit Title VI to a prohibition of intentional discrimination.235 An 
agency challenged on its disparate-impact regulations thus fails Chevron 
step one.236 Carrying the analysis to its conclusion, in such a situation 
where the "intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. "237 Disparate-impact regulations plainly 
go beyond what is in Lambert's eyes the "unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress" that "Title VI ... proscribe only those racial 
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause .... "238 
and must therefore fail as beyond agency authority.239 
This reasoning is un persuasive for the very same reason that 
Guardians Association and Choate cannot support the validity of dispa-
rate-impact regulations-Bakke only addressed the scope of Title VI as 
dicta.240 Lambert and the Sandoval Court fail to give weight to the 
Bakke Court's own words of caution: "[i]n this Court the parties nei-
ther briefed nor argued the applicability of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Rather, as had the California court, they focused exclu-
sively upon the validity of the special admissions program under the 
Equal Protection Clause. ''241 Bakke addressed the scope of Title VI only 
because canons of judicial decision-making dictate that courts should 
avoid deciding issues according to constitutional interpretation when 
285 Lambert, supra note 206, at 1210-11, 1215-18. "The Court's holding in Bakke fore-
closes any claim that the Title VI definition of discrimination is ambiguous: Bakke held that 
the Title VI prohibition is co-extensive with that of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus 
reaches only intentional discrimination." [d. at 1217. 
236 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Lam-
bert, supra note 206, at 1210-11,1215-18. 
237 See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
2!18 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287. 
289 See Lambert, supra note 206, at 1215-18. 
240 This discussion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281, is consistent with the definition of dictum 
found in BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY. See supra note 218; see also Charles F. Abernathy, Title 
Wand the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining "Discrimination, • 70 GEO. LJ. 1, 20 
(1981) ("[Bakke's] statement that 'Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is absolutely 
coextensive with the Constitution's was unnecessary for decision of the case,'"); Gil Ku-
jovich, Desegregation in Higher Education: The Limits of a Judicial Remedy, 4.4 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 
41 (1996) ("Bakke presented only the specific issue of whether Title VI prohibits race-based 
affirmative action when such action is permitted by the Constitution. The case did not 
require a decision on the general congruence between Title VI and the Constitution."). 
241 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281. 
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they can instead rest their decisions upon statutory interpretation.242 
The Bakke Court, however, after conducting its review of Title VI, 
found only that Congress intended Title VI to be coextensive with the 
Equal Protection Clause, bringing the Court back to where it began, 
at having to decide the broader constitutional issue of whether Equal 
Protection demanded the application of strict scrutiny to racial 
classifications designed for the benefit of insular minorities.243 Such a 
fruitless digression, moreover, leaves Bakke's words regarding Title VI 
sitting at the wayside of the opinion as mere dicta244 because the Bakke 
majority's pronouncement as to the scope of Title VI was unnecessary 
to the Court's ultimate conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause 
calls for strict scrutiny of all racial classifications regardless of mo-
tive.245 Therefore, although the Bakke Court might have said as much, 
it never held that Congress intended Title VI to prohibit only inten-
tional discrimination.246 Accordingly, "the rule of Bakke and Guardians 
Association that section 601 forbids only intentional discrimination"247 
appears to have been conjured out of thin air, rather than drawn from 
sound precedent. 
Nevertheless, the same examination of Title VI's legislative history 
performed by the Bakke Court will undoubtedly be resurrected by those 
currently seeking to challenge the validity of disparate-impact regula-
tions.248 The argument would point to Title VI's legislative history as 
unambiguously expressing congressional intent that Title VI be coex-
tensive with the Equal Protection Clause.249 Assuming arguendo that the 
legislative history of Title VI cited by Bakke does indeed establish Con-
gress's intention to draw Title VI along the Constitutional lines of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it is a violation of temporal logic to point to 
Washington v. Davis as having incorporated the 88th Congress's concep-
tion of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore Title 
242 [d. (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring». 
243 See id. at 287--88. 
244 See supra note 218. 
245 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291-305. 
246 "This court is bound by holdings, not language." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275,282 (2001) (Scalia,J.). 
247 [d. at 282. 
248 Indeed, what the Bakke Court implicitly stated in dicta was that Congress clearly and 
unambiguously expressed its intent to limit Title VI to a prohibition of intentional dis-
crimination. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281-87. This is a Chevron step one analysis. For the rea-
sons outlined here, and in Part III.C.2. infra, however, the Bakke Court performed this 
analysis incorrectly. 
249 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281--87. 
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VI. This is for the simple reason that when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was enacted, Washington v. Davis and the doctrine of intent were still 
twelve years from existence. In 1964, the Equal Protection Clause was 
not yet recognized as clearly prohibitive of only intentional discrimina-
tion.250 Rather, during the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was debated 
and enacted, the scope of Equal Protection was a fiercely contested and 
unsettled question. 251 Therefore, clear congressional intent to limit Ti-
tle VI's scope to a prohibition of intentional discrimination cannot be 
supported by pointing at scattered references in the legislative history 
to a then-ambiguous Equal Protection Clause. 
C. Chevron Step One Analysis: Title VI Is Ambiguous 
Having dismissed the arguments that Guardians Association and 
Choate establish the validity of disparate-impact regulations, and the 
counterargument that Bakke indicates clear congressional intent to 
limit the scope of Title VI to intentional discrimination, we turn now to 
an independent analysis of EPA's disparate-impact regulations, using 
four out of the five tools of statutory construction introduced in the 
preceding discussion:252 (1) the plain language of Title VI; (2) the legis-
lative history of Title VI; (3) the underlying purpose of Title VI; and (4) 
subsequent legislative action after the enactment of Title VI. The statu-
tory tool of examining statutory structure, employed in American Min-
ing Congress,253 is implicit in the discussion of legislative history. 
250 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976). The Court did draw attention to 
several jury selection cases in which they had previously indicated the necessity of proving 
intentional exclusion of blacks from jury pools to establish an Equal Protection violation. 
See id. at 239-43. However, the Court also recognized a long line of appellate cases that had 
"expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making 
out an equal protection violation." See id. at 244-45. The Court then found it necessary to 
disagree explicitly with these cases and offer a policy analysis of why proof of discrimina-
tory intent is a necessary component of showing an Equal Protection violation, thereby 
implicitly indicating that prior to Washington v. Davis, the issue had not yet been conclu-
sively settled. See id. at 245-48. It can only be assumed then, that at the time the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, the judiciary had not yet reached consensus on the scope 
of Equal Protection. 
251 See supra note 250; Abernathy, supra note 240, at 8 (remarking that during congres-
sional debate on Title VI, "the state of constitutional [Equal Protection] interpretation was 
continually evolving."). 
252 Supra Part II.B.I. 
253 Am. Mining Congo V. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
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1. The Plain Language of Title VI 
The Bakke Court observed that "the concept of 'discrimination' 
... is susceptible of varying interpretations. "254 The plain language of 
Title VI, however, does not express a clear and unambiguous congres-
sional intent to define that inherently ambiguous term according to 
either an effects standard or an intent standard.255 Examining sec-
tion 601 specifically, the term "subjected to discrimination," just as the 
term "stationary source" in Chevron U.S.A., is left conspicuously 
undefined.256 
Therefore, as in Sweet Home, a court would likely turn to the com-
mon dictionary definitions of "discrimination," "discriminate," and 
"discriminating" in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity.257 The Sweet 
Home Court defined "harm" according to Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary as "to cause hurt or damage to: injure. "258 Just as this 
definition still leaves open the question of whether such i~ury must be 
intentional,259 so does the similarly worded definition of "discrimina-
tion" leave open the question of intent: "the act, practice, or an in-
stance of discriminating categorically rather than individually. "260 The 
word "discriminating" is further defined as "making a distinction,"261 
which still leaves open the question of motivation or intent. The root 
word "discriminate" is no less ambiguous, being defined as "to make a 
difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disre-
gard of individual merit. "262 Examining additional dictionaries, as did 
254 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284. Several other courts have made similar observations as to the 
ambiguity of the word "discrimination." See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 
463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) (White, J.) ("The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; 
the word 'discrimination' is inherently so."); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 
158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The term 'di~crimination' as used in Title VI is, of 
course, notoriously ambiguous .... "). 
255 See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-l (2000). 
256 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, with Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 859-62 (1984). 
257 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98 
(1995) . 
258 [d. at 697 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1034 (Mer-
riam-Webster, Inc. 1966». 
259 [d. 
260 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 648 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 
1986) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. Discrimination is also defined as "the according of differ-
ential treatment to persons of an alien race or religion (as by formal or informal restric-
tions imposed in regard to housing, employment, or use of public community facilities)." 
[d. 
26( [d. 
262 [d. 
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the Court in MCI Telecommunications, it is found that multiple lexicog-
raphers employ similarly ambiguous definitions.263 Contrary to the los-
ing argument in Mel Telecommunications, where only a single source 
contained a deviant definition of the statutory term in question,264 "dis-
crimination" is universally defined without limitation or restriction to 
only intentional acts. 
In analyzing the definition of "harm," the Sweet Home Court ob-
served that the dictionary "does not include the word 'directly' or 
suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads to injury 
constitutes 'harm."'26!i The same reasoning applies to an examination 
of "discrimination." The definitions of "discriminate," and the various 
forms thereof, do not include the word "intentional," or in any way 
suggest that intent is necessary in order to "discriminate" or to be 
"subjected to discrimination. "266 Accordingly, just as the Sweet Home 
Court recognized the ability to unintentionally "cause hurt or dam-
age" to an animal by destroying its habitat,267 so must the courts rec-
ognize the ability to unintentionally "make a difference in treatment 
. . . on a class . . . basis in disregard of individual merit, "268 by disre-
garding the racial compositions and existing environmental burdens 
of different communities across a state. 
263 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-28 (1994); THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 247 (4th ed. 2001) ("Discriminate: 1. To make a clear 
distinction; differentiate. 2. To make distinctions on the ba;is of preference or preju-
dice."). While the second definition seems to contemplate intent, it in reality does not. 
Noticeably absent from this definition is any notion of knowledge of one's preference or 
prejudice, or the intentional desire to exercise that preference to someone's detriment. 
Just as one does not need to exercise intent in order to "harm" an animal, one does not 
need to exercise intent in order to make distinctions on the basis of preference or preju-
dice. Prejudice and preference can be subconscious and unrecognized. See also BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 209 (2nd pocket ed. 2001) ("Discrimination, ... 2. Differential treatment; 
esp., a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found 
between those favored and those not favored.") (emphasis added). This definition con-
templates the very concept of unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination. See Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426-36 (1971). 
264 MCI Telecomm. C01P., 512 U.S. at 225-28. 
266 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995). 
266 See WEBSTER'S, supra note 260, at 648. 
267 See Sweet Home Chapter ofCmtys.for a Great Dr., 515 U.S. at 697-98,699 n.12. 
268 See WEBSTER'S, supra note 260, at 648 (defin ition of discrimination). 
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2. The Legislative History of Title VI 
Extremely thorough accounts of Title VI's vast and procedurally 
complicated legislative history have been recounted elsewhere.269 For 
our purposes here, however, it will be sufficient to touch upon the 
overall theme of the debates and compromises surrounding the en-
actment of Title VI,27o rather than to recite the innumerable individ-
ual remarks made in committee and in floor debate. Using the con-
trary approach, the Bakke Court employed as their sole analytical 
technique the selective quotation of committee and floor remarks. 
This method of legislative analysis, particularly as applied to Title VI, 
has been criticized as having "dubious" value271 because, inter alia, it 
fails to take account of the complex "dance of legislation"272 that pro-
duced the final compromise version.273 This compromise arose from 
overall congressional acknowledgement of the inherent ambiguity 
contained in the word "discrimination,"274 and indeed, several indi-
vidual remarks acknowledge this understanding.275 
The meaningful conclusion to be drawn from the legislative his-
tory, however, is not that individual members disagreed as to what "dis-
crimination" did, or should have meant, but that because of this very 
disagreement, Congress intentionally decided to leave the question 
statutorily unresolved.276 In the words of Chevron U.S.A., they "[did] not 
directly address [] the precise question at issue. "277 Instead, the legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intentionally placed the resolution 
269 See, c.g., STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1017-1456 
(Bernard Schwartz, ed. 1970); Abernathy, supra note 240, at 1-49. 
270 Title VI was proposed and debated upon in a substantially different form from what 
was ultimately enacted into law. Abernathy, supra note 240, at 22 & n.148 (citing Civil 
Rights: Hemings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 659 (1963». 
271 Abernathy, supra note 240, at 22 (citing Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit 
LoveAffair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 155 (1965». 
272 Id. (citing E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 10 (1973) (quoting WOODROW 
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 297 (1913». 
273 Abernathy also notes the minimal probative value of quotations from Title VI de-
bate that refer to Constitutional principles, because members of Congress commonly em-
ploy Constitutional rhetoric merely to strengthen their arguments, and not necessarily to 
indicate their specific interpretation of a statute. See id. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 25 (citing H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 106 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2391, 2473 (minority views of Reps. Poff and Cramer». Several other members expressed 
concerns that "discrimination" might include "mere racial imbalance" (i.e., disparate im-
pact). Id. at 25-26 & nn.173-74. 
276 See Abernathy, supra note 240, at 26-32. 
277 Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
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of the scope of Title VI in agency hands, to be determined according to 
the needs of the programs administered by each agency.278 
Professor Abernathy presents the following sequence of events: Sec-
retary Celebrezze of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW), while under cross-examination by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee Number Five, remarked that if HEW deter-
mined that the effects of "racial imbalance"279 in a school district created 
the same problems as de jure segregation, then "steps [would] have to be 
taken under Title VI. "280 Fear over a lack of rational basis upon which 
that determination would take place led members of the Committee to 
suggest that HEW present guidelines explaining exactly how the De-
partment would apply Title VI.281 Presumably in response to these fears 
over arbitrary administrative interpretation of Title VI enforcement du-
ties, Title VI was subsequently amended in subcommittee to mandate the 
administrative adoption, and presidential approval, of clear and specific 
regulations that applied Title VI's general antidiscrimination clause to 
specific agency-funded programs.282 
At the very least, a general confusion over how the word "discrimi-
nation" would be interpreted in practice, the failure of the Subcommit-
tee to reach any consensus, and their unwillingness to firmly resolve the 
issue through specific statutory language indicate ambiguity and con-
gressional failure to address the precise question at issue.283 At the 
most, when specific remarks regarding the final version of the bill are 
considered, it could be argued additionally that Congress specifically 
intended to leave resolution of the scope of "discrimination" to admin-
istrative discretion.284 For example, Attorney General Robert F. Ken-
nedy had stated that the "particular [federal] program, with [the anti-
discrimination principle of section 601] as a general criterion to follow, 
will establish the rules that will be followed in the administration of 
the program-so that the recipients of the program will understand 
278 See Abernathy, supra note 240, at 29-30; see also Bradford C. Mank, Are Title WS Dis-
parate Impact Regulations Valid 7, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 517, 528-32 (2002) (discussing Aber-
nathy'S conclusion that Congress intended to leave the precise meaning of discrimination 
unresolved, and to instead delegate the issue to administrative discretion). 
279 The then popular term for "disparate-impact discrimination." Abernathy, supra 
note 240, at 25-26. 
280 Id. at 27. 
281Id. 
282 See id. at 28-30. This amendment exists as current section 602. 
283 See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
284 See Abernathy, supra note 240, at 29-30. 
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what they can or cannot do."285 Even more indicative of a clear con-
gressional intent to avoid the issue and punt to agency discretion is 
the uncontested House minority report on the final version of the bill, 
predicting administrative "reI [iance] upon [their] own construction 
of 'discrimina'tion' as including the lack of racial balance."286 Also, in 
passing on the House bill, the Senate raised concerns over whether 
Title VI would permit regulations that corrected "racial imbalance." 
Instead of resolving this general question with clear and specific lan-
guage, the Senate only addressed a narrower issue by prohibiting the 
use of school busing orders as a means of correcting racial imbal-
ance. 287 
3. The Purpose of Title VI 
The underlying purpose behind the enactment of Title VI is less 
than enlightening in resolving the question of whether Congress ad-
dressed the precise scope of prohibited discrimination. Ame1ican Mining 
Congress directs that "the sense in which [a term] is used in a statute 
must be determined by reference to the purpose of the particular legis-
lation. "288 In Ame1ican Mining Congress, the court reviewed congressional 
findings of fact to determine that the purpose of RCRA was to elimi-
nate the health risks posed by disposal of solid and hazardous waste 
when the disposal is done without careful planning and man age-
ment.289 This narrowly tailored purpose lent guidance to the court as it 
sought to define the statutory term "discarded. "290 The court reasoned 
that if Congress had been chiefly interested in eliminating the health 
risks of dumping, then Congress also clearly intended "discarded" to be 
confined to its ordinary meanings of "disposed" and "abandoned," 
rather than expanded to include in-process materials not destined for a 
landfill-and therefore not posing a present health risk. 291 
The situation in Title VI is quite dissimilar because it involves an 
interesting paradox, illustrated by the Chester Residents court's elucida-
tion of the statute's dual purpose: "to: (1) combat discrimination by 
285 [d. at 30 & n.209 (emphasis added). 
286 See id. at 30 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 68 (1963), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2436). 
287 [d. at 32. 
288 Am. Mining Congo v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177, 1185 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (quoting Burnet v. Chi. Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 6 (1932)). 
289 See id. at 1185-86. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. 
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entities who receive federal funds; and (2) provide citizens with effec-
tive protection292 against discrimination. "293 But "discrimination" is 
the very word whose contours we are interested in defining. The con-
gressional purpose in enacting Title VI contains the exact same ambi-
guity as the statute itself, and therefore can not aid in our search for 
congressional intent.294 
4. Subsequent Legislative Action 
Legislative enactments subsequent to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
do little to shed light on Congress's original intent in enacting Title 
VI, but may arguably indicate congressional ratification of Title VI 
disparate-impact regulations. 295 Crucial to this discussion is the opin-
ion in BTOwn & Williamson Tobacco where the Court wrote that "[al-
though at] the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausi-
292 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Sandoval, seizes upon this "prophylactic" purpose, and 
offers an alternative route around the obstacle to disparate-impact regulation validity cre-
ated by Sandoval's reading of Bakke's dicta. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 303-10 
(2001) (Stevens,]., dissenting). Justice Stevens writes that "§ 602 ... grant[s] the responsi-
ble agencies the power to issue broad prophylactic rules aimed at realizing the vision laid 
out in § 601, even if the conduct captured by these rules is ... broader than that which 
would otherwise be prohibited [by section 601 acting alone]." [d. at 305. In other words, 
regardless of what conduct section 601 alone can be said to prohibit, section 602 expressly 
grants agencies the power to go beyond the strict contours of section 601 in order to effec-
tuate Title VI's "broad aspiration [s]. " See id. at 306. According to Justice Stevens, the rela-
tionship of section 601 to section 602 can be viewed in two possible ways. The first concep-
tualization-and the one adopted by this Note and the Sandoval majority-is one where 
sections 601 and 602 "stand in isolation "-section 601 is the "meat" of the law, and section 
602 merely "effectuates" the law as set out by section 601. [d. at 304. The second conceptu-
alization-embraced by Justice Stevens-is one where sections 601 and 602 are part of an 
"integrated remedial scheme." Id. If sections 601 and 602 are viewed as an "integrated 
remedial scheme," then disparate-impact regulations, rather than going beyond the au-
thority of section 601, "apply § 601's prohibition on discrimination just as surely as the 
intentional discrimination regulations the majority concedes are privately enforceable." [d. 
at 307. Whatever Bakke might have said in regard to the scope of section 601, then, be-
comes irrelevant in deciding upon the validity of a disparate-impact regulation-a dispa-
rate-impact regulation can arguably be found to be a valid furtherance of the broad anti-
discriminatory aspirations of Title VI. See id. at 303-07. 
293 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936 (3d Cir. 
1997), vacated as moot, 524 V.S. 974 (1998). 
294 COlllpa11! id., with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 V.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-l (2000). 
295 Note that the "congressional ratification" argument for the validity of Title VI dis-
parate-impact regulations, while still grounded in Title VI's ambiguity, is technically dis-
tinct from the "administrative deference/ Chevron" argument. See Mank, supra note 278, at 
532-39 (discussing the congressional ratification argument in detail, and applying the 
opinion in Food & Dmg Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco C01P. to that argu-
ment). 
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ble meanings ... [olver time ... subsequent acts can shape or focus 
those meanings. "296 
This cannon of statutory construction seems particularly applica-
ble to the ambiguity of Title VI, given the apparent breadth of Title 
VI's scope. "[Tlhe implications of a statute may be altered by the im-
plications of a later statute. This is particularly so where the scope of 
the earlier statute is broad but the subsequent statutes more 
specifically address the topic at hand."297 In Brown & Williamson To-
bacco, the Court was faced with six separate pieces of tobacco-specific 
legislation enacted since the passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA).298 Reviewing these pieces of legislation,299 the Court un-
covered a persistent stance by FDA that it lacked jurisdiction to regu-
late tobacco products.30o Accordingly, Congress over the years created 
a distinct tobacco regulatory scheme separate and apart from FDA.301 
What this amounted to then, reasoned the Court, was congressional 
ratification of FDA's long held position that it lacked jurisdiction to 
regulate tobacco.302 
An exactly opposite situation is seen in the history of Title VI. 
Immediately upon the statute's enactment, a presidential task force, 
in conjunction with the Department of Justice-which had helped 
draft the language of Title VI-promulgated model Title VI enforce-
ment regulations barring the use of criteria or methods having a dis-
criminatory impact.303 Every federal agency responsible for adminis-
tering federal financial assistance-about forty-has subsequently 
adopted Title VI regulations embracing this effect-based standard.304 
This long-held position of the executive branch-that the execu-
tive had the authority to prohibit disparate-impact discrimination un-
der Title VI-has been ratified by subsequent antidiscrimination legis-
lation in much the same way the subsequent tobacco legislation of 
296 Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 
(2000). 
297 [d. 
298 [d. 
299 [d. at 143-55. 
300 [d. at 155-56. 
301 [d. 
302 Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 156. 
303 Mank, supra note 278, at 518 & n.8. 
304 [d. at 518 & n.9. 
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Brown & Williamson Tobacco ratified FDA's rejection of authority to 
regulate tobacco.305 
Furthermore, an amendment to Title VI made immediately after 
its enactment may also indicate congressional ratification of Title VI 
disparate-impact regulations. Two out of the three early and major 
amendments to the Act merely made modifications to the funding 
termination procedures that agencies were required to follow, and did 
not in any way modify or alter section 601 of the original Act.306 The 
third amendment, however, popularly known as the Stennis Amend-
ment,307 stated Congress's intention that the provisions of Title VI be 
applied equally to all states where discrimination in education is con-
cerned.308 In doing so, the Stennis Amendment explicitly mentions de 
jure and de facto segregation, lending probative value to the argu-
ment that the 88th Congress could not have clearly intended to limit 
Title VI to intentional discrimination.309 If Title VI had prohibited 
only intentional discrimination, and limited agencies to the same, 
then the Stennis Amendment would not have stated that "guidelines 
and criteria established pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ... dealing with ... segregation by race, whether de jure or de 
facto, in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall 
be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States whatever the 
O1igin or cause of such segregation. "310 Rather, the explicit language of the 
Stennis Amendment indicates congressional acquiescence to Title VI 
disparate-impact regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental justice is a legal and social paradigm predicated 
upon the reality that environmental harm is not shared equally among 
305 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 143-55; Mank. mpra note 278, at 532-33 
(discussing several pieces of an tidiscrirnination legislation that implicitly ratify Title VI 
disparate-impact regulations by requiring adoption of regulations "similar" to those 
adopted under Title VI. Such an implication is created because almost all Title VI regula-
tions prohibit disparate impacts). 
306 See Abernathy, supra note 240, at 33. These amendments were: Education Funding 
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 112, 81 Stat. 787 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 
(2000», Education Funding Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 182, 80 Stat. 1209 (1966) (codified 
at 42 U .S.C. § 2000d-5 (2000». 
307 See Abernathy, supra note 240, at 34 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 2, 84 Stat. 121 
(1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (2000»). 
308 See Abernathy, supra note 240, at 35. 
309 Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 2, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 
(2000» . 
310 [d. (emphasis added). 
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communities, but rather, is disproportionately shouldered by poor, mi-
nority neighborhoods. The unequal distribution of environmental 
harm often occurs through government sanctioned permitting proc-
esses. The traditional difficulty in seeking redress for the discriminatory 
effects of environmental permitting is that environmental decisions are 
rarely made today with overt discriminatory animus. Rather, it is an 
economically, politically, and socially entrenched reality that these 
"blind" decision making processes, left to themselves, will subject poor, 
minority communities to a disparate share of environmental harm as 
compared to surrounding affiuent, Caucasian neighborhoods. So 
called "disparate-impact" regulations promulgated by EPA pursuant to 
Title VI initially showed promise as a legal tool to obtain redress from 
discriminatory effects. The Alexander v. Sandoval Court closed the door 
to private enforcement of disparate-impact regulations by taking away 
those regulations' implied cause of action and rejecting the existence 
of a § 1983 enforceable right against disparate-impact discrimination. 
In so doing, the Court also strongly suggested that disparate-impact 
regulations, standing alone within EPA's own administrative enforce-
ment process, were invalid exercises of administrative discretion under 
Title VI. The Court's implicit reasoning, based upon Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, is un persuasive because, contrary to Sando-
val's assertion, Bakke never held that there existed clear congressional 
intent to limit the scope of Title VI to intentional discrimination. Con-
versely, the Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission-Alexander v. 
Choate line of cases is incapable of standing for the proposition that 
disparate-impact regulations are valid law. Rather, ChevTOn U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resoun:es Difense Council provides the only appropriate means of 
determining the validity of disparate-impact regulations. After working 
through a ChevTOn analysis, it is apparent that the 88th Congress never 
expressed a clear and unambiguous intent as to the scope of Title VI's 
anti-discrimination mandate. Because the 88th Congress did not pre-
cisely address whether "discrimination" embodied an intent or effects 
standard, under the holding of the Court's opinion in ChevTOn U.S.A., 
the judiciary must defer to EPA's permissibly constructed disparate-
impact regulations. 40 C.F.R. 7.35(b) therefore remains valid federal 
law after Sandoval. 
